Research

Unpublished drafts available upon request

My research in philosophy of race draws on resources from philosophy and the social sciences to develop a philosophical reconstruction of the dominant conception of racism in contemporary anti-racist social movements. I identify two key features in the social movement conception of racism: racism is understood primarily as a system of race-based oppression, and “racism” is used primarily as an explanatory concept. I also have a research interest in Latin American philosophy with a focus on clarifying and assessing criticisms of historical and contemporary accounts of Latin American identity (and mestizaje, in particular) as racist and colonial political projects.

"Mariátegui's Analysis of the Indian Problem as a Decolonial Philosophical Project," in The Bloomsbury Handbook of American Philosophies, edited by Terrance MacMullan and Sergio Gallegos-Ordorica (Bloomsbury Academic, forthcoming)

I argue that Mariátegui’s diagnosis of the Indian problem in Peru is part of a rich but underappreciated philosophical tradition that posits coloniality as a key global problem and seeks to find solutions to it. This decolonial philosophical tradition is informed by and advances the concrete demands and visionary projects that arise in the context of decolonization struggles around the world. Writing in early 20th century Peru, Mariátegui contributes to this tradition by explaining the persistent marginalization and socio-economic precarity of indigenous people as the result of a complex system of colonial, capitalist, and racial domination, which in Peru takes the form of gamonalismo and imperialist capitalism.

“Mariátegui’s Indo-American Socialism and the Problem of Privileged Solidarity,” Radical Philosophy Review, published online on February 24, 2026, https://doi.org/10.5840/radphilrev2026220166

I assess the contributions and limitations of Mariátegui’s Indo-American socialism as a solidarity project aimed at the liberation of indigenous people in Peru. I argue that Mariátegui’s Indo-American socialism offers a good starting point for a coalitional political project between Marxist and indigenous social movements in Latin America. Its decolonial contributions include recognizing indigenous people as revolutionary agents, prioritizing cross-racial solidarity, and centering the needs of indigenous people. However, I also contend that Mariátegui’s coalitional politics are flawed insofar as he fails to fulfill duties of solidarity with indigenous people. I articulate this criticism by drawing on a prominent debate between Mariátegui and Luis Alberto Sánchez, as well as Sally Scholz’s deontic account of solidarity.

“Is Conceptual Inflation a Problem for a Theory of Institutional Racism?,” Ethics 134, no. 2 (2024): 179-213, https://doi.org/10.1086/727273

I address the objection that the concept of racism has become overly inflated. The charge of conceptual inflation is often leveled against conceptions of racism that go beyond the traditional understanding of racism as race-based ill-will or disregard. Theories of institutional racism are a common target of conceptual inflation critics, especially when they ascribe racism to institutions partly in virtue of their impact. Conceptual inflation critics argue that theories of institutional racism engage in untoward conceptual inflation insofar as they undermine our moral understanding of racial phenomena, hinder our ability to explain the causes of racial inequality, and even undercut struggles for racial justice. I develop an original account of institutional racism that is immune to all three versions of the conceptual inflation challenge.

“Is Affirmative Action Racist? Reflections toward a Theory of Institutional Racism,” Journal of Social Philosophy 54, no. 2 (2023): 218–35, https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12467

I defend impact-based accounts of institutional racism against the criticism that they are over-inclusive. If
having a negative impact on non-whites suffices to make an institution racist, too many institutions (including
institutions whose affirmative action policies inadvertently harm its intended beneficiaries) would count as racist. To address this challenge, I consider a further necessary condition for these institutions to count as racist—they must stand in a particular relation to racist ideology. I argue that racist ideology limits social criticism of and collective action against institutions that have a negative racial impact.

“Racism: A Moral or Explanatory Concept?,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24, no. 3 (July 2021): 651-659, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-021-10175-7

I argue that racism should not only be conceived as a moral concept whose main function is to communicate severe moral condemnation. The paper advances a complementary interpretation of racism as an explanatory concept—one that plays a key role in explaining race-related social problems afflicting members of historically subordinated racialized groups. As an explanatory concept, racism explains the persistence of race-related social problems, which contributes to the pragmatic anti-racist end of developing better political and policy strategies for solving these problems.

Paper on the Moralism Critique of Anti-Racism (under review)

According to the charge of moralism, anti-racists are overly focused on condemning others of the “sin of racism”. Moralism critics accuse anti-racists of adopting a stance of moral superiority on matters of race and of being quick to label those who do not meet their exacting moral standards as “racists” who deserve to be shamed, shunned, or even “canceled”. My first goal is to show that many criticisms of contemporary anti-racism in public discourse (e.g. wokeness, cancel culture, moral grandstanding, conceptual inflation) can be helpfully understood through the lens of a more general critique of anti-racism as moralistic. My second goal is to show that the moralism critique fails—at least with respect to an influential strain of contemporary anti-racism, i.e. radical black feminist pragmatism. I highlight two features of the political philosophy of RBFP that are incompatible with moralism—the focus on diagnosing and solving social problems produced by racial oppression, and the commitment to transformative justice.

Paper on Mariátegui and Mestizaje (under review)

I engage with criticisms of mestizaje discourse for its role in perpetuating racial and colonial oppression in Latin America and the Latinx diaspora. I examine whether José Carlos Mariátegui’s mestizaje model opens the door to a “mestizaje otherwise”—one whose starting point is the denunciation of racial and colonial oppression. I offer an original interpretation of Mariátegui’s views on mestizaje. While he is often portrayed as a critic of mestizaje, I contend that Mariátegui holds an indigenous-centric conception of mestizaje that stems from his critique of Eurocentric mestizaje. Ultimately, I argue that Mariátegui’s mestizaje model remains tied to racial and colonial ideologies and is thus unable to overcome the criticisms raised against mestizaje discourse.

Work in Progress

A Critical Model of the Politics of Recognition: The Case of Indigenous Struggles in Bolivia (draft available upon request)

How is Racism Systemic? (first draft in progress)

Positional interests and Structural Explanations of Oppression (first draft in progress)